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Abstract: The paper is of descriptive character and is based on literature review. It 
reviews the concept of homo economicus and homo politicus in the history of economic 
thought and tries to discover their characteristics in homo agricola. As demonstrated, one 
component of homo agricola can be of economic and another one of political nature. 
Those components can be separated or can be together. Agricultural economists, however, 
in their sophisticated mathematical models seem to reduce farmers’ behaviour to 
economic behaviour or rather to self-interested homo economicus. 
Institutional economics, social economics and socio-economics are closer to actual human 
nature, than homo economicus. The further research challenge before agricultural 
academia is to develop the model that will be able to fully explain the questions involving 
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“The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving 
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the 
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational 
behavior in the real world.” 
Herbert Simon (1957: 198) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In an economic profession, it has been generally accepted that economics is the science that 
studies how societies use scarce resources to produce valuable commodities and distribute 
them among different people (SAMUELSON 1948) or examines human behaviour as a 
relationship between given ends and scarce means which have alternative uses (ROBBINS 
1932).  
It has been claimed that economics consists of a set of purely descriptive hypotheses 
explaining regularities in the behaviour of producers and consumers (VARIAN 1992). Opposite 
to this argumentation, I consider economic theory as an essentially normative discipline that 
cannot be separated from ethical (ETZIONI 1988) and political considerations. 
In mainstream economy, behaviour is often formalised following the rational actor-approach. 
Some economists regard economic man as a construct or abstraction useful for getting definite 
theoretical results, a concept they use largely since its consistency with their deductive 
mathematical models or since believed usefulness in generating successful predictions even if 
is not realistic (TOMER 2001). Economists may consider the character of economic man to be 
close to human reality in certain spheres of activity such as when dealing with anonymous 
transactions in competitive markets but not descriptive of human behaviour in other spheres 
(VINER 1991: 75-76). 
The successes achieved by mathematical and statistical methodology as well as computer 
programming tools over the course of the 20th century seemed to justify unlimited faith in the 
ability of optimization models to explain all economically significant forms of human 
behaviour. As a result, in core economic journals the material relates to economic theory, and 
“economic theory itself has been continuously more abstract and mathematical” (STIGLER et 
al. 1995: 339). 
After reviewing recent literature, it becomes appear that the majority of agricultural 
economists are possibly not interested in going beyond the boundaries of conventional neo-
classical economics. For example, VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL and NIVYEVSKIY (2009), taking 
a sample based on complete coverage of 11 peer-review journals in agricultural economics 
from 1989-2008 concluded that farm size/structure, reforms/policy and 
productivity/efficiency had been the most important subject categories of 200 articles dealing 
with transition or transition countries. Also ZAWOJSKA  (2008)  when examining thematic 
profile of 392 papers published in the proceedings of the latest 12th EAAE Congress „People, 
Food and Environments: Global Trends and European Strategies” revealed that the most 
studied topics covered: trade/competitiveness, efficiency/productivity and 
consumers/consumption. In both cases, method-driven research and sophisticated quantitative 
and qualitative techniques were dominated.   
We are witnessing that mainstream economics and its models are unable to solve the most   3
urgent societal and political challenges. It seems important for agricultural economists to 
aspire to an integrated approach that incorporates the best of all the different schools of 
economics thought, not limiting themselves to the conceptions of any specific school, and 
particularly to a value-free neoclassical economics. Hence, there is a great challenge for 
integrating economics with both moral and political considerations. According to Theodore 
Schultz, the Nobel Prize winner in 1979, in traditional
1 agricultural settings farmers are not 
responsive to normal economic incentives but instead often respond perversely with the 
implication that the supply curve of farm products is backward sloping (SCHULZ 1964: 81) as 
well as they often have no profit opportunities. 
In the literature of economics, sociology and politics much has been written about different 
models of man, however relatively little has been said about man named by ancients “homo 
agricola”.    
The aim of this study is to consider the economic, moral and political aspects of farmers’ life 
in different epochs of economic thought and in today’s days. The paper is of descriptive 
character and is based on literature review.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the models of 
humanity in the history of economic thought. Afterwards, homo agricola is examined through 
economic, moral and political lenses. The paper ends with concluding section that summaris 
previous sections and proposes recommendations for futher research. 
2. THE IMAGE OF MAN IN DIFFERENT THEORIES OF ECONOMICS 
When trying to discover homo economicus (homo oeconomicus), my search of the economic 
literature uncovered many replacements and supplements such as, for example, homo faber 
(BERGSON 2005), homo politicus (NYBORG 2000; FABER et al. 2002; BECKER 2006; GRANT 
2008), homo sociologicus (PODGÓRSKI 2008; NG and TSENG 2008), homo socio-economicus 
(TOMER 2001), homo moralis (ZAK 2008; DEN UYL 2009), homo reciprocans (GINTIS 2000; 
BOWLES and GINTIS 2002; HAGEDORN 2002), homo sustinens (SIEBENHÜNER 2000), homo 
ecologicus (BECKER  2006),  homo hierarchicus (DUMONT  1980) and homo sapiens 
oeconomicus (DOPFER 2004). 
Economic theory mainly relies on the assumption that economic agents may be likened to a 
"homo oeconomicus”.  Homo oeconomicus, the man who acts on pure economic motives 
alone, is the concept of man at the heart of mainstream economics. He or she is a selfish, 
rational and utility maximizer. Adam Smith, however, referred not only to selfishness (SMITH 
2000a) but also to sympathy as a specific characteristic of the human being (SMITH 2000b). 
He did not consider self-interest to be synonymous with selfishness and thus devoid of ethical 
considerations. Self-interest is a very significant motivation but it is not enough. Beyond self-
interest there are other critical missing variables, such as ethics, for instance. 
Many heterodox economists are not strictly anti-mainstream; they generally wish go beyond 
the mainstream in order to develop an economics with a better conception of how the 
economy is integrated with society. 
Table 1 presents one by one the main characteristics of economic man in different economic 
perspectives.  
                                                 
1 Farming based wholly upon the kinds of factors of production that have been used by farmers for generation 
can be called traditional agriculture.   4
Table 1:  Characteristic comparison of the economic man  









defined preferences for 
things and experiences 
that provide satisfaction 
for the self 
May be self-
interested, but what he 










oriented to obtaining 
pleasure 
Rational (i.e. perfectly 
adaptive); he makes 
decisions that lead to his 
maximum utility or 
output under the given 
conditions (optimizing 
behaviour) 
Is not rational in the 
manner of homo 
economicus; he is not 
a lightning calculator 
of utility, and he does 
not attempt to  
maximize utility 
Sometimes, he is as 
rational as homo 
economicus but more 
often he behaves non 
rationally, reflecting 
both his habits and 
biases 
Is not a rational decision 
maker. 
His decisions are sub-
rational due to his rather 
limited intellectual 
capabilities 
Separated from his 




Is not separated from 
his human and 
physical outer world 
Oriented to belonging 
to communities and 
institutions. 
Promotes the welfare 
of the entire 
community 
Oriented to others, to 
family, community, 
society and the 
obligations and 
commitments, often 




politics, and so forth 
unless these enter his 
preferences 
Behaves in line with 
habits and rules, is 
strongly influenced by 
institutions, and learns 
from his social  
experience 
Acts out of a concern 
for justice, human 
dignity, duty, loyalty 
and other moral and 
ethical considerations 
He chooses largely on 
the basis of emotions 
and value judgments, 
and only secondarily on 
the basis of logical-
empirical considerations 
Has given, unchanging 
character which is not an 
object of theoretical and 
empirical study 
Does not have a given, 
unchanging character 
Develops his 
character in order to 
realize his higher 
personal potential 
 
Source: Own compilation based on TOMER (2001), HODGSON (1998), WHALEN (1996), O’BOYLE 
(1994) and ETZIONI (1988). 
 
Homo institutional economicus or institutional economic man is quite different from homo 
economicus or economic man; with respect to the indicated characteristics, he remedies some 
deficiencies of economic man and thus, represents an improvement. The character of homo 
social economicus or social economic man includes the higher aspects of human nature than 
of institutional economic man. Homo socio-economicus or socio-economic man, as opposite 
to homo economicus, is not rational or sometimes semi-rational. As said by ETZIONI (1988: 
253) his behaviour is determined by two separated and often conflicting parts. The first one is 
similar to homo economicus in that he is self-interested and oriented to obtaining pleasure. 
The second part is oriented to others as well as to the obligations and commitments that membership 
involves.  
One of the main critiques of the homo economicus model is that in some situations individuals do   5
not behave like economic man, i.e. in real world humans do not always act rationally or in pursuit 
of self-interest
2. Additional critique concerns the narrowness of behaviour analysis. Table 2 
consists of selected critics of the neoclassical conception of the maximizing man. 
 





Anthropological foundations of modern economics failed to account for the 
complexity of human choice in a dynamic world. 
Economic man “is an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except 
for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another”. 
MISES (1949: 
62, 651) 
Rejection of mechanical version of rational choice, homo oeconomicus. “Economics 
deals with real actions of real men. Its theorems refer neither to ideal nor perfect 
men, neither to the phantom of a fabulous economic man (homo oeconomicus) nor to 
the statistical notion of an average man (homme moyen)”. 
MASLOW 
(1971: 310) 
Materialist approach: “skilled, exact, technological application of a totally false 
theory of human needs and values, a theory which recognizes only the existence of 




Agents often have multiple goals and use these goals to eliminate alternatives from 
the choice set in order to make choice more manageable. 
Rather than maximise their utility, they make decisions that are good enough or 
satisfactory and that represent reasonable or acceptable outcomes. 
The economic man represents the objective rationality in an ideal model. In reality, 





The unrealism of the maximization model as a description of human behaviour. In 
real world humans do not always act rationally or in pursuit of self-interest. 
Source: review of literature. 
 
 
The human actor labelled homo politicus and developed by FABER et al. (2002: 328) is based 
on ethical considerations and essentially characterized by its “striving for political justice”. It 
recognizes this striving as an essential trait of its existence as a being capable of reason. 
3. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE OF HOMO AGRICOLA 
3.1. The myth of virtuous homo agricola   
According to Marcus Tullius Cicero, a Roman polymath, “homo agricola” is a country, rustic, 
rural individual; a peasant or farmer (ROMEO 1979: 7).  
The myth of virtuous farmer originates in ancient Greece and Rome. In ancient Greece, where 
nearly 80% of the population farmed for a living, any study of economics was first and 
foremost a study of managing a farm. The word “economy" comes from the Greek word 
oikonomia (oikonomiké) meaning “household management” or stewardship in the New 
                                                 
2 In order to focus attention upon the discrepancy between the perfect rationality assumed in classical economic 
theory and the reality of human behaviour, Herbert Simon, for example, introduced the term “bounded 
rationality” (SIMON 1991).   6
Testament. 
Aristotle, usually used world “oikonomiké” (“the economic”) to refer to anything which is 
related to the use of wealth in order to achieve the Good Life (ARISTOTLE 1995). However, he 
held that oikonomiké and its related technique, chrematistics
3, referred not only to the house 
but also to the polis. 
So, farming is the oldest respectable profession. More than two thousand years ago Cicero 
wrote: “of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none 
more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a freeman” (CICERO 1991). 
Centuries before Cicero, Xenophon, Greek philosopher, in one of the earliest work on 
economics “Oeconomicus”
4, declared that agriculture was a noble profession, the only 
essential occupation of man and the mother of all arts:   
“We went on to determine that for the true gentleman agriculture was the finest 
occupation and science of all those by which men gain a living. For we came to the 
conclusion that this occupation was the easiest to learn and the most pleasant to be 
occupied in, and that it, more than all others, made the body fine and strong, whilst 
it allowed the mind full leisure to have some care for both friend and country. We 
decided also that agriculture in some degree was an incentive to bravery, in that it 
not only produces the necessaries of life, and that, too, where there are no bulwarks 
of defence, but also maintains those who occupy themselves in it”(RUSKIN 1876: 
38). “Agriculture, too, teaches us to help one another; for just as in facing their foes 
men must join together, so must they in agriculture” (RUSKIN 1876: 33). 
Virtues of farming were celebrated by many more recent thinkers, among others by Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. For example, in his collection Society and Solitude under the title "Farming" 
he says about farmers and farming in this way: (Farmer) “stands close to nature; he obtains 
from the earth the bread and the meat. The food which was not, he causes to be. The first 
farmer was the first man, and all historic nobility rests on possession and use of land” 
(EMERSON 1870). 
On the other side of coin, there is an image of agricola  who operates purely for profit, 
showing no regard for his impact on the soil, water, air and animals:  
“By avarice and selfishness, and a groveling habit, from which none of us is free, of 
regarding the soil as property, or the means of acquiring property chiefly, the 
landscape is deformed, husbandry is degraded with us, and the farmer leads the 
meanest of lives. He knows Nature but as a robber." (THOREAU 1854). 
 
Certainly, the economy of those times differs from contemporary economy but there are still 
people who view farm profession and the family farm as an important, not only economically, 
but morally and politically. 
3.2. Homo agricola as homo economicus 
What motivates economic activity of peasant or farmer? Obviously, a first response might be 
                                                 
3 Chrematistics “is a form of acquisition which the manager of a household must either find ready to hand, or 
himself provide and arrange, because it ensures a supply of objects, necessary for life and useful to the 
association of the polis or the household” (ARISTOTLE 1995; Politics I, 8, 1256b: 26-30).  
4 Xenophon’s Socratic dialogue on household management was translated by Cicero into the Latin oeconomicus 
(BOTLEY 2004: 9).   7
the self-interest pursuance or seeking whatever is beneficial or advantageous for him. Self-
interest is primary motivation grounded in the material necessities of self-preservation, thus 
pursuit of self-interest is natural, ubiquitous and necessary to keep us alive (see for example 
GRANT 2008).  
As  VAN DER VAART et al. (2006: 750) say: “To us modern agriculturalists, “Why farm?” 
seems like a non-question. Intensive food production is what supports our large, complex 
societies. It frees many of us to become specialists, enriching life in ways beyond mere 
provisioning: as doctors, entertainers, scientists. Without crop cultivation, our current 
population densities and growth rates would be impossible to sustain”.  
If we assume self-interested behaviour of farmer, it is possible to change what he/she does by 
rewarding some responses and penalizing others. Individuals will obey the rules if marginal 
costs of not doing so outweigh the marginal benefits. In like fashion, they will curtail 
behaviour which is levied and increase behaviour which brings subsidies
5.  
For when the liberal state makes policy, it is the stereotyped “economic man” which it has in 
mind. Indeed, it was also true for the former Central and Eastern European countries, which in 
the 1990s implemented liberal or neo-liberal reforms, including domestic and external 
liberalization of agriculture. During transition period the main emphasis was on successful 
market agriculture and more liberal market policies. Such approach to transitional agriculture 
was applied among others by LERMAN et al. (2002: 5) according to whom: “Transition in 
agriculture includes abolishing central planning; reducing government intervention; 
eliminating price controls; developing functioning market services; and encouraging the 
emergence of rural credit institutions, technological improvement, new capital investment 
patterns, and agricultural labor adjustment. The most visible and widely debated component 
of this process, however, is land reform, that is, the transformation of farns operated on 
traditional socialist principles to operations based on market-oriented principles”. 
In many developed countries, economic efficiency arguments (maximization of productivity 
/and labour efficiency) resulted in the dramatic expansion of industrial agriculture, which, on 
a one hand, provided benefits such as lower-cost foods, but on another hand made it 
increasingly hard for small family farmers to stay in business, so both the number of people 
engaged in agriculture and the number of farms has declined sharply. When all we have is a 
couple of industrial farms, it's no longer a lifestyle, they are not farming for the joy of farming 
or feeding, the factories are farming for profit. 
Self-sufficient, subsistence farming is often viewed by governments as an indication of 
economic inefficiency, and its eradication is perceived as a sign for a modern economy.   
Family-owned and managed farms still play a vital role in many countries, including my 
homeland Poland. Interactions in family farms are distinctive because they are embedded in 
identity of household and farm thus in the parent-child relationships found in the household, 
and therefore are characterized by altruism. 
Through analogy to any family unit of production, altruism makes each family member employed 
by the family farm a de facto owner of the farm (STARK and FALK 1998). An interesting, in this 
context, are results obtained for Northern Ireland by JACK  and her colleagues (2009) 
indicating that small-scale farm household behaviour is influenced not just by current farm 
income, but also expected capital asset returns. Increased wealth, associated with continuing 
land ownership and off-farm income remove the pressure from farming income to fund all 
                                                 
5 As a good example can serve higher incentives for farmers to grow non-food biofuel crops, which combined 
with other factors caused food shortages (and even food riots) in several countries as well as boosting food prices 
around the world in 2007 and 2008.   8
family consumption needs. This enables households to sustain low-income farming activities 
in order to pursue other objectives such as wealth management (including tax efficient 
transfer of wealth) and lifestyle. Consequently, the results indicate that the survival of small-
scale family farms may be much less sensitive to agricultural support policies than has been 
commonly suggested. 
According to SIMON (1993: 160) appropriate attention to altruism substantially changes 
theories of the economy. Economists generally model altruism as a utility function in which the 
welfare of one individual is positively linked to the welfare of others (BERGSTROM 1989).  
Liberal and neo-liberal policies stimulating efficiency-driven agriculture have also resulted in 
problems of rural community decline and disconnect between farmers and their community. 
MINTZ (2006: 5), for example, identifies this problem as follows: “Every day more and more 
people eat more and more food that has been grown, processed, or cooked for them by fewer 
and fewer others”.  
The findings of the GOLDSCHMIDT
6 (1947), LOBAO (1990) and MCILVAINE-NEWSAD et al. 
(2008)  indicate that large-scale industrial style agriculture is generally related to worse 
socioeconomic conditions for rural communities than smaller-scale family based farms. The 
former has harmful effects on many indicators of community quality of life, particularly those 
involving the social fabric of communities (LOBAO and STOFFERAHN 2008). 
Given the shifts in the structure of agriculture towards an extremely large-scale, economically 
dominated system, an important step in modern agriculture transition is rebuilding direct links 
between farmers and consumers. An alternative farming type operation there may be small-
scale civic agriculture. LYSON  (2004) defines this form of agriculture as a locally-based 
agricultural and food production system that is closely linked to a community’s social and 
economic development. Some examples include farmers markets, pick-your-own operations 
and community supported agriculture operations. LYSON (2004: 93) argues that, “As social 
institutions and social organizations, farmers’ markets can be important components of civic 
agriculture. As bridges between the formal and informal sectors of the economy, they enable 
individual entrepreneurs and their families to contribute to the economic life of their 
communities by providing goods and service that may not be readily available through formal 
market channels. They embody what is unique and special about local communities and help 
to differentiate one community from another”. 
The rise of civic agriculture coincides with the rise of the post-productivist slow food 
movement, which arose in Italy, but has now spread around the world (MCILVAINE-NEWSAD 
et al. 2008). According to DELIND (2002: 217), “civic agriculture can (and should) promote 
citizenship and environmentalism within both rural and urban settings not only through 
market based models of economic behavior, but through common ties to place and physical 
engagement with that place”. 
3.3. Homo agricola as homo politicus 
For David Hume, moral and political philosophy are a single enterprise. In his view, homo 
economicus and homo politicus were identical twins (HARDIN 2008: 463). 
Homo moralis, sometimes substituted by homo reciprocans, differs from homo economicus in 
that it takes into account the ambivalence of human morality (HAGEDORN 2002: 38). 
David Hume, a Scottish philosopher, in his Treatise (HUME 1737, book III, part II, section 5)   
                                                 
6 The Goldschmidt in his original study put forward the hypothesis that rural community welfare is negatively 
associated with the scale of farms surrounding them.   9
provides one of the clearest illustrations of the problem of morality, namely trust (between 
farmers). He writes of two farmers: 
“Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow. Tis profitable for us both that I 
shou'd labour with you today, and that you shou'd aid me tomorrow. I have no 
kindness for you, and know that you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take 
any pains on your account; and should I labour with you on my account, I know I 
shou'd be disappointed, and that I shou'd in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here 
then I leave you to labour alone: You treat me in the same manner. The seasons 
change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and 
security”. 
The pursuit of economic interests by farmers explains not only their economic but also 
political activity which arises in order to protect and promote various interests. Let me cite an 
evidence of pubic conflicts among stakeholders of Common Agricultural Policy. In 1971, one 
of the largest farmers’ protests in post-war West Germany took place; in Bonn about 50 
thousand farmers gathered to demand continued price supports to prevent “further injustice in 
agriculture” (PETRICK 2008: 249). Also Poland is a good example of collective action among 
farmers to protest the government’s policies and bring about more favourable policy 
outcomes including tax policy and social, particularly farmer retirement, policy (see 
ZAWOJSKA 2006). 
According to political psychology, however, there are interest independent passions that 
motivate political behaviour. Those passions revolve about issues of status, justice as well as 
community and solidarity (GRANT 2008).  
Status passions (such as competitiveness, ambition, vanity and the desire for honour) aim at 
esteem, distinction or recognition relative to others. Justice passions, such as anger and pity, 
as reactions to perceived injustice, can motivate people to act politically on behalf of others in 
an attempt to restore justice. Community and solidarity passions (such as loyalty, attachment 
and opposite to them enmity) are tided to psychological process of group identification.  
The above mentioned passions usually combine together to produce political conflict and 
political mobilization. These passions overcome collective action problems. There is little 
temptation to be “free rider” if an individual really wants to assert his dignity or express his 
outrage, his hatred and his sense of solidarity and nobody else can do these things for him. 
When taking into account the operation of the passions, explanations of politics based on 
economic models which assume the rational or homo economicus behaviour are particularly 
weak in explaining social movements (GOODWIN 2001; GOULD 2004) and economic interests 
alone are not sufficient for explanation farmers’ motivations for any political action. 
Within post-communist Europe, the Solidarity movement in Poland may exemplify this better 
than anything else. Independent Self-governing Trade Union of Individual Farmers 
“Solidarity” established in 1980 was a part of growing Solidarity movement (CIRTAUTAS 
1997) and represented at least half of Poland's 3.2 million smallholders. The organization and 
mobilization of anger was instrumental in orchestrating fundamental sociopolitical change, in 
providing a new social and moral order and also in restoring trust and solidarity in society 
(see DONSKIS 2007). Another example of such social movement can be farmers’ riots in the 
Chinese countryside, from the dramatic events of 1989 to more recent stirrings (O'BRIEN 
2009).  
3.4. Homo agricola “lives” in governance structures  
Governance is about achieving coordination between actors with divergent interests,   10
ambitions and perceptions. Probably most recent frequently cited governance author, 
Williamson, identifies three efficient governance structures: via market, via contractual rules 
or bilateral governance and via hierarchy or hierarchical governance (WILLIAMSON 1975). All 
three forms are characterized by enormous incentive differences. I look at the governance 
from a different perspective, following THOMPSON  et al. (1991)  and POWELL (1990) who 
distinguished hierarchical governance, network governance and market governance. 
In present policy processes, for example with regard to rural development, there emerged a 
fourth type of governance, namely knowledge governance (VAN BUUREN and ESHUIS 2008). 
The differences between the four models of governance are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Modes of governance for different homines 
 Market  Network  Hierarchy  Knowledge 
Basic principle  exchange  reciprocity  power  cognition 
Mode of 
calculation 










partner or network 
manager 
principal ruler  knowledge, 
infrastructure, 
developer 
Key value  public choice   public value  public goods  public ideas 
Source: MEULEMAN (2008) and VAN BUUREN and ESHUIS (2008). 
 
When we assume that homo agricola acts as homo economicus and reacts to such tendencies 
in the agricultural sector as economic efficiency growth through scale enlargement as well as 
internationalization, markets seem to be the most proper mode of governance. Market 
coordinates then through “the invisible hand” of the price-based exchange between self-
interested actors. 
In cases where different stakeholders have come together to effectively deal either with 
agricultural or social problems and dilemmas (to act as homos politicus), network governance 
is recommended. Social networks can be even more essential than the existence of formal 
institutions for effective enforcement and compliance with regulations. However, a history of 
bad relationships and distrust can hinder a cooperative/collaboration process, taking Poland’s 
agricultural cooperatives as a good example (see for example CHLOUPKOVA et al. 2003). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper highlights the concept of homo economicus and homo politicus with an attempt to 
discover their characteristics in homo agricola. As demonstrated, one component of homo 
agricola can be of economic and another one of political nature. Those components can be 
separated or can be together.  
Hence, the question arises whether agricultural economists, as profession, should reduce 
farmers’ behaviour to economic behaviour or rather to self-interested homo economicus, 
obsessive benefit-maximising prototype whose mainstream economic theory takes for 
granted. In other words, should we, agricultural economists, believe in the myth of homo 
economicus? If so, should we suppose that any stakeholder in agri-food sector behaves like an 
econometrician or a statistician in order to predict economic events?   11
Each of the homines at the heart of institutional economics, social economics, and socio-
economics are more realistic, that is, closer to actual human nature, than homo economicus, 
partly since the each embodies non-economic incentives and influences. Analyzing 
agriculture in transition we should go beyond productivity, efficiency, technical change etc. as 
measures of agriculture and rural performance. 
The challenge for further research is to develop the model that will be able to fully explain the 
questions involving all human behaviour of homo agricola, that is farmer or rural man with 
set of different objectives: instrumental (ex. maximizing income), intrinsic (ex. enjoying the 
farming), social (ex. gaining recognition, belonging to the  community) and personal (ex. 
achieving self-fulfilment and personal growth). 
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